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Abstract: Can voluntary disclosure be used to enhance insiders’ strategic trade while providing legal 
cover? We investigate this question in the context of 10b5-1 trading plans. Prior literature suggests that 
insiders lose strategic trade value if their planned trades are disclosed. But disclosure might enhance 
strategic trade because courts can only consider publicly available evidence from defendants at the motion 
to dismiss phase of trial. This practice can enhance legal protection for firms that disclose planned trades, 
especially those disclosing detailed information. Consistent with increased legal protection, we find that 
voluntary disclosure of planned trades increases with firm litigation risk and potential gains to insiders’ 
trades. We also find that insider sales and abnormal returns are higher for disclosed plans, especially those 
that articulate specific plan details. This suggests that voluntary disclosure, which is conventionally 
thought to reduce information asymmetries, can create legal cover for opportunistic insider trading. 
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1.     Introduction 
Ever since Louis Brandeis (1933) wrote “[s]unlight is the best of disinfectants,” disclosure has 
been assumed to be a mechanism for reducing the opportunities for strategic trade behavior by insiders 
who possess private information about a firm. Although disclosure has direct and indirect costs, the 
prevailing literature assumes disclosure reduces information asymmetries and is therefore good for 
uninformed market participants. Finance and accounting theory suggests that corporate insiders do not 
have incentives to disclose pending trades in advance of trading in their own firm’s stock (e.g., Baiman 
and Verrecchia, 1996). Advance disclosure reveals insiders’ private information about the expected value 
of the stock price (e.g, Admati and Pfleiderer, 1991; Khan and Lu, 2011), and this can induce investor 
front-running, i.e., selling before insiders in anticipation of their sales. Either of these have the potential 
effect of lowering share prices before insiders’ sales execute.1 Accordingly, prior theoretical research 
predicts there would be no voluntary disclosure of private information before insiders trade.  
We propose that this theory does not fully consider how legal rules can shape firms’ disclosure 
incentives, and significantly alter insiders’ trading incentives. For instance, voluntary disclosure not only 
provides information to potential counterparties but, given the process dictated by the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, also provides incremental litigation risk reduction. We show this litigation risk reduction 
arising from disclosure of insiders’ trading plans creates opportunities for insiders to enhance their profits 
from trading.  
We use an exogenous rule change regarding the legal effect of insiders’ commitment to trade in 
the future, found in Rule 10b5-1 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as a mechanism to test the 
impact of voluntarily disclosed trading plans on insiders’ strategic trade potential. Rule 10b5-1 was 
promulgated in October 2000 to better allow insiders to diversify firm-specific holdings by providing an 
affirmative legal defense for trades that are prearranged at a time when insiders attested they did not 
possess material, nonpublic information.
2
 The SEC does not mandate disclosure of information regarding 
insiders’ 10b5-1 use, which gives rise to considerable variation in whether and what firms voluntarily 
disclose information about their insiders’ 10b5-1 trading plans. As discussed in detail below, the 
affirmative defense protection provided by the Rule is most valuable if 10b5-1 trading plans are publicly 
disclosed, especially when disclosures provide specific details. We examine whether this incremental 
legal protection arising from disclosure creates greater opportunities for insiders to trade strategically. 
We first examine whether the incremental legal protection arising from disclosure of Rule 10b5-1 
trades motivates firms to voluntarily disclose information regarding insiders’ planned trades to mitigate 
                                                 
1
 There is typically more insider sales than purchases on the open market, particularly within Rule 10b5-1. See, e.g., 
Jeng, Metrick, and Zeckhauser (2003) and Jagolinzer (2009). 
2
 See Jagolinzer (2009) and Veliotis (2010) for a detailed discussion of the regulatory development of Rule 10b5-1. 
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litigation risk concerns, and to satisfy the disclosure demands of outside constituents. We find evidence 
that the decision to disclose 10b5-1 trading plans is more common for firms with higher overall litigation 
risk and with greater potential for strategic trade by insiders (i.e., when firm-specific stock price volatility 
is high). This evidence suggests that firms’ decisions to disclose 10b5-1 trading plans are motivated by 
concerns over litigation risk from insiders’ trade. In addition, we find evidence that the decision to 
disclose is more common for firms with more financially sophisticated boards, larger institutional 
ownership, and greater analyst following. This evidence suggests that boards with greater financial 
expertise better understand the benefits arising from the disclosure of 10b5-1 trading plans, and that firm 
outsiders demand information about 10b5-1 trading plans. 
We then examine whether the incremental legal protection arising from disclosure of Rule 10b5-1 
trades limits or enhances insiders’ ability to trade strategically. Our tests investigate insiders’ trade and 
return patterns, as they are typically considered by courts at the motion-to-dismiss stage of trial to 
evaluate claims of scienter. We find evidence that the number of sale transactions by participants rises 
dramatically after the disclosure of 10b5-1 plan participation, and increases with disclosure specificity. In 
contrast, we do not find evidence of elevated sale transactions by insiders who trade outside of Rule 10b5-
1 plans (hereafter, non-participants). This evidence suggests that participants view disclosure of 10b5-1 
plans, especially disclosure of specific plan information, as providing significant legal benefits. They 
trade more freely in these plans in ways that might otherwise give rise to greater legal liability. 
Using abnormal return patterns as another benchmark regarding informed trade, we find that the 
returns following insiders’ sales in 10b5-1 trading plans that are voluntarily disclosed are more negative 
relative to the returns following insiders’ sales for those inferred to be trading within, but not disclosing, 
10b5-1 plans. In addition, we find evidence that insiders’ sales generate the largest abnormal returns when 
specific plan details are voluntarily disclosed. This behavior appears fortuitously timed, and suggests that 
greater disclosure occurs when there is greater certainty about pending negative performance (i.e., a 
strategy of “hiding in plain sight”).  
Taken together, our findings provide important new insights regarding firms’ decisions to 
voluntarily disclose information to the public. There is little prior research that directly investigates the 
link between voluntary disclosure and insider trading, which is surprising given the potential legal 
consequences.
3
 One notable exception is Rogers (2008), who utilizes a sample that predates Rule 10b5-1 
and finds that firms voluntarily disclose higher quality financial information prior to insiders’ sales to 
                                                 
3
 There is a well-developed literature that examines why firms voluntary disclose financial or firm-performance 
information and its association with litigation risk (e.g., Skinner, 1994; Francis, Philbrick, and Schipper, 1994; 
Kasznik and Lev, 1995; Skinner, 1997; Baginski, Hassell, and Kimbrough, 2002; Field, Lowry, and Shu, 2005; 
Rogers and Van Buskirk, 2008; Rogers, 2008). However, most of this literature does not consider insider trading 
implications. There is also some ambiguity regarding the degree to which voluntary disclosure of financial 
information (e.g., management’s earnings forecasts) mitigates litigation risk (Field, Lowry, and Shu, 2005). 
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limit their litigation risk. While these findings provide evidence that firms attempt to forego insiders’ 
strategic trade advantage to limit their litigation risk through the disclosure of private information, they do 
not speak to whether litigation-reducing disclosure can actually enhance an insiders’ strategic trade 
advantage. Our study provides evidence that it can. This counterintuitive finding arises directly from 
courts providing affirmative defense protection in motion to dismiss proceedings only to those plans that 
are publicly disclosed. For this reason, disclosure enhances the probability of early case dismissal, which 
can therefore provide greater protection for insider trades. 
Our findings also provide important new insights regarding the efficacy and consequences of 
Rule 10b5-1 by showing that insiders’ ability to engage in strategic trade appears to vary directly with the 
extent of disclosure. Jagolinzer (2009) establishes that insiders (identified through voluntary disclosure) 
can generate abnormal returns through trading within 10b5-1 plans and that these returns are greater than 
those earned by non-participants from the same firm.
4
 Jagolinzer (2009), however, does not examine why 
firms disclose 10b5-1 plans, why there is cross-sectional variation in these disclosures, or what 
implications these choices have on insider trading profitability. More evidence regarding how firms and 
insiders behave under the Rule should provide useful insights, considering the enormous magnitude of 
stock being traded within these plans (e.g., in a single year within our sample, insiders sold $25 billion 
worth of shares within these plans). We extend this prior research in two ways. First, our cross-sectional 
analysis of firms within 10b5-1 plans provide new insights regarding firms’ decisions to disclose their 
plans—i.e., that voluntary disclosure increases with firm litigation risk, insider strategic trade potential, 
financial sophistication of the board and voluntary disclosure demands of institutional owners and 
financial analysts. Second, and more importantly, our results provide new insights regarding how insiders 
are able to exploit the Rule—i.e., through enhanced disclosure.  
Section 2 of this study provides background information regarding Rule 10b5-1 and outlines 
expectations regarding disclosure choice determinants and implications. Section 3 outlines sample 
selection procedures. Section 4 outlines empirical tests and results. Finally, section 5 concludes. 
2.     Trading Plan Disclosure Choice and Implications 
2.1.   Disclosure Choice 
The decision to disclose information about insiders’ participation in Rule 10b5-1 is a firm-level 
(e.g., board of directors) choice. We infer this because disclosure is observed through firm-level 
disclosure instruments (e.g., SEC 8-K, Form 4, 10-Q/K filings and press releases) that often require 
processing through the firm’s legal, media relations, and or investor relations departments. We also infer 
                                                 
4
 Two other studies investigate the effect of adoption of 10b5-1 trading plans on firms’ decisions, but are not 
focused directly on insider trading activity. Henderson (2012) observes a shift in executive pay arrangements 
following adoption of 10b5-1 trading plans. Shon and Veliotis (2012) observe a higher propensity for firms to meet 
or beat analysts’ earnings forecasts at firms that adopt Rule 10b5-1 plans.   
 4 
this because we commonly observe multiple insiders from the firm named in a single firm disclosure 
document, which seems to indicate that insiders are not individually disclosing their participation. Finally, 
we infer this because several corporate attorneys and Rule 10b5-1 plan administrators have anecdotally 
conveyed that firms (e.g., boards) determine policy regarding disclosure of these plans. What is not clear, 
however, is why firms disclose information about their insiders’ use of 10b5-1 plans or why there is 
considerable variation in how much detail is disclosed about insiders’ use of these plans. 
Firms likely disclose planned trades (pursuant to Rule 10b5-1) details to reduce legal risk. The 
biggest component of this legal risk derives from the potential for securities class action lawsuits.  If sued 
in a securities class action, firms face potentially large defense and settlement costs.
5
 These costs do not 
increase linearly over time, but rather increase substantially after an initial hearing on the validity of the 
plaintiffs’ claims, called a “motion to dismiss” proceeding. Because of the nature of these costs, firms 
have strong incentives to “win” a class action case at the motion to dismiss stage. Crucially, courts may 
not consider the 10b5-1 affirmative defense at the motion to dismiss phase if the plans are previously 
undisclosed. This is because courts cannot consider materials other than the plaintiff’s pleadings when 
considering the motion, and defendants are not typically allowed to rebut factual allegations.  Courts can, 
however, consider publicly available documents that are not a part of the complaint, e.g., taking judicial 
notice of already released SEC filings, prospectuses, analysts’ reports, and other publicly reported data. A 
publicly disclosed 10b5-1 plan thus has a greater likelihood of influencing a motion to dismiss than a plan 
that is not publicly disclosed. Numerous cases stand for this proposition.
6
  
Corporate advisors share this view. For example, Institutional Shareholder Services, the largest 
proxy advising firm for institutional shareholders, concludes, “such plans should be filed in some form 
with the SEC so that [they] . . . can be considered at the motion to dismiss stage” (White, 2003). Lawyers 
                                                 
5
 “[C]ompanies are paying the legal costs of…executives defending themselves against fraud allegations. The 
amount of money being paid…totals hundreds of millions, or even billions of dollars. A company’s average cost of 
defending against shareholder suits last year was $2.2 million according to Tillinghast-Towers Perrin.” Laurie P. 
Cohen, “Adding Insult to Injury: Firms Pay Wrongdoers’ Legal Fees”, The Wall Street Journal, February 17, 2004. 
Average firm settlements are approximately $30 million per suit. More than ten suits settled between $300 million 
and $6 billion in 2005 alone (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2005). 
6
 See, e.g., Weiner v. Klais & Co., 108 F.3d 86, 88-89 (6th Cir.1997) and In re Royal Appliance Sec. Litig., 1995 
WL 490131, at *2 (6th Cir. Aug.15, 1995).  Precedent cases suggest that disclosure is needed to mount a defense at 
the motion to dismiss stage. For example, Fener v. Belo Corp.425 F.Supp.2d 788 (N.D. Tex. 2006) notes that 
plaintiffs have an obligation to address in their complaint whether a trading plan was in effect, and if so, “why . . . 
this does not undercut a strong inference of scienter.” Friedman v. Rayovac Corp., 291 F. Supp. 2d 845 (WD. Wis. 
2003) notes that it would generally not consider the trading plan or any other document appended to the motion to 
dismiss, but it would in this case as the plan was “publicly available on the SEC's website and was filed as an exhibit 
to numerous reports Rayovac filed with the SEC.” In re Netflix, Inc. Sec. Litig., 2005 WL 1562858 (N.D. Cal. June 
28, 2005) and Weitschner v. Monterey Pasta Company, 2003 WL 22889372, No. C 03-0632 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 
2003) the courts consider publicly disclosed trading plans at the motion to dismiss stage to find no strong inference 
of scienter. S.E.C. v. Healthsouth Corp., 261 F.Supp.2d 1298, 1322-3 (N.D.Ala., 2003) notes the existence and 
disclosure of a trading plan to rebut the SEC’s allegations of the requisite scienter for securities fraud. 
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advising firms on securities fraud litigation matters also think disclosure is a prerequisite to risk 
reduction: “[t]he adoption of the Rule 10b5-1 trading plans . . . should be publicly disclosed” to reduce 
the risk of litigation (Roberts and Porritt, 2004; Siegel and Lenahan, 2002).  In short, while undisclosed 
10b5-1 plans provide some risk reduction in the event the case goes to trial, disclosure can further 
enhance legal protection by increasing the likelihood of early dismissal for securities class action suits.  
One other detail about trial procedure is relevant to the disclosure decision. Because the motion to 
dismiss stage consists of a preliminary look at the merits of the case, the degree of detail disclosed 
regarding insiders’ Rule 10b5-1 plans likely impacts the probability of dismissal. If only the existence of 
a plan is disclosed, a court may not have sufficient information at this stage of litigation to ascertain 
whether the insider sufficiently complied with the Rule and whether the allegedly fraudulent trades are 
covered by the plan. If the full details about planned trades (e.g., dates, amounts, or prices) are disclosed, 
however, a court may better ascertain whether the allegedly fraudulent trades fall within the Rule’s 
affirmative defense, thereby increasing the probability of a low-cost dismissal. A recent decision by the 
First Circuit reaches exactly this result and thus highlights the importance of making specific disclosures.
7
 
The preceding discussion suggests that firms likely obtain litigation benefits from Rule 10b5-1 
plan disclosures, and that the benefits are increasing in the specificity of the public disclosures. If so, then 
one would expect firms with greater ex ante litigation risk to be more apt to disclose the existence and 
details of Rule 10b5-1 plans. Litigation risk can be measured both in terms of the firm’s propensity for 
general class action risk and in terms of insiders’ strategic trade potential.8 
While there are clear legal risk reduction benefits from public disclosure, it may increase costs for 
insiders if investors can infer insiders’ strategic intent from disclosure (Rogers, 2008) or if disclosure 
enhances investors’ monitoring of insiders’ trade plan commitment. Specifically, if the act of disclosure 
causes investors to infer strategic intent by insiders then disclosure can induce investor front-running, i.e., 
selling before the insiders, (e.g., Khan and Lu, 2011) or information acquisition that can reveal insiders’ 
private information (e.g., Admati and Pfleiderer, 1991) and effectively lower price before insiders’ trades 
execute. Accordingly, firms’ insiders may prefer non-disclosure when litigation risk is low, as insiders’ 
front running costs can outweigh the incremental legal protection afforded by disclosure and firms likely 
bear the costs of making insiders “whole”. Interviews and comment letters regarding proposed mandatory 
                                                 
7
 Miss. Pub. Employ. Retire. Sys. v. Boston Scientific Corp., __ F.3d. __, 2008 WL 1735390 (1st Cir. Apr. 16, 2008) 
(reversing grant of motion to dismiss because trial court inappropriately considered undisclosed 10b5-1 trading plan 
at the motion to dismiss phase). 
8
 In models of insiders’ strategic trade (e.g., Huddart and Ke, 2007), insiders’ information advantage is determined 
by prior stock price variance and the precision of insiders’ private information. Low investor uncertainty—i.e., low 
prior stock price variance—provides little scope for profitable insider trade, even if the insider possesses perfect 
private information. For a given level of private information, then, insiders’ strategic trade potential is increasing in 
prior stock price variance. Insiders’ strategic trade potential is also increasing in insiders’ private information about 
pending performance. This construct, however, is not observable. 
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disclosure indicate that front-running concerns factor into the decision to not disclose or to disclose little 
detail regarding 10b5-1 participation: “We do not believe the establishment, modification, or termination 
of Rule 10b5-1 arrangements should be reported. …[R]equiring disclosure of the mere presence of these 
plans would attribute meaning where none may exist” (Cleary, Gottleib, Steen & Hamilton, 2002).  
Relatedly, if disclosure provides investors with insiders’ 10b5-1 plan details, then it allows for ex 
post reconciliation of plan commitment. As discussed below, Rule 10b5-1 creates a valuable real option 
by allowing insiders to selectively terminate plans even when they possess material, nonpublic 
information. If plans are not disclosed, the option’s cost is zero. Disclosure, however, raises the cost of 
the option by allowing outsiders to reconcile data reported in insiders’ transaction reports with details 
provided with 10b5-1 disclosures.
9
 Reconciliation could reveal insiders’ use of the strategic early plan 
termination option, potentially increasing regulatory scrutiny of insiders’ good faith compliance with the 
Rule.
10
 Therefore, greater disclosure reduces insiders’ value of the early termination option. Ceteris 
paribus, insiders should generally prefer no disclosure. 
Outside shareholders might infer 10b5-1 disclosure benefits if disclosure provides for better 
monitoring of or greater insider commitment to disclosed trade plans. In addition, firms with greater 
demands for voluntary disclosure from other outsiders (e.g., financial analysts) might benefit more by 
providing more disclosure to meet these demands. Finally, larger and more financially sophisticated 
boards might better understand the legal benefits of disclosing 10b5-1 plans. Therefore, there is likely a 
positive relationship between the probability of firm disclosure and outside demand for information and 
also the size and financial sophistication of the board.   
2.2.  Disclosure Implications for Strategic Trade 
To understand the potential effect of disclosure on strategic trade, it is helpful to consider the type 
of information an insider might have at 10b5-1 plan initiation and the likelihood that an insider might 
obtain valuable private information over the duration of her trading plan. Consider, for example, an 
insider who possesses some information at plan initiation but does not expect to obtain highly valuable 
information over the duration of her plan (e.g., if the firm exhibits low volatility). This insider may be less 
concerned with potential trade-based litigation risk because the nature of her information is less likely to 
generate legal scrutiny and she already obtains some litigation protection from entering a 10b5-1 plan 
even if it is not disclosed. If the firm discloses information about her plan, this insider may be concerned 
that she will lose her modest information advantage (e.g., if the market falsely infers that she is privately 
                                                 
9
 Insiders are required to file a report with the SEC – Form 4 – within two days of all trades. 
10
 The SEC states that “[t]ermination of a plan, or the cancellation of one or more plan transactions, could affect the 
availability of the Rule 10b5-1(c) defense for prior plan transactions [SEC Division of Corporation Finance, Manual 
of Publicly Available Telephone Interpretations, Fourth Supplement, Rule 10b5-1, Question 15(b) (issued May 
2001)].” 
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informed and adjusts price downward before her trades execute). If this were the case, then this particular 
insider would prefer non-disclosure.
11
 If this setting describes the case for non-disclosure of plans then 
non-disclosed 10b5-1 sale transactions are less likely to be associated with patterns of strategic trade. 
Consider next an insider who does not possess valuable information at plan initiation (or who 
may possess valuable information with high uncertainty) and who expects to obtain valuable information 
(e.g., an updated signal regarding his/her initial information) over the duration of his/her plan. This 
insider may establish a 10b5-1 sales plan in anticipation of a potential bad outcome yet want the option to 
terminate the plan if an updated signal subsequently indicates the bad outcome will not materialize. 
Because this strategy would ex post reveal a suspicious trade pattern if the bad outcome does materialize, 
the insider would likely value some incremental legal benefit from disclosure. And because a key element 
to this strategy is preserving the termination option, this insider would not prefer for the firm to disclose 
specific details about his/her 10b5-1 plan. The insider would prefer for the firm to only disclose limited 
detail, as this provides some incremental litigation risk reduction and yet preserves the termination option 
at relatively low cost.
12
 If this setting describes the limited disclosure group of trades, then trade patterns 
would be consistent with ex ante uncertainty and subsequent early termination.
13
 Early termination would 
remove sales that would otherwise be non-profitable, so sales that are retained likely reveal modest 
patterns of strategic trade. 
Finally, consider an insider who possesses valuable negative (and reasonably certain) information 
at plan initiation.
14
 This insider may establish a 10b5-1 sales plan in anticipation of a reasonably certain 
bad outcome. Because the probability of the bad outcome is high, the insider does not expect to execute 
the termination option (as it is unlikely that a subsequent updating signal will indicate the bad outcome 
will not materialize). This strategy would ex post reveal a suspicious trade pattern when the bad outcome 
materializes (and this strategy is expressly forbidden by Rule 10b5-1), so the insider would likely value 
the incremental legal benefit from specific disclosure. And because the insider does not value the early 
termination option, he/she is willing to forego the option in lieu of enhanced legal protection by providing 
specific details regarding his/her trade plan. If this setting describes a specific disclosure group of trades, 
then trade patterns would be consistent with ex ante certainty regarding pending negative performance. 
                                                 
11
 Any price response may only last for a short duration if market participants subsequently realize that insiders are 
acting in good faith.  However, trading activity typically increases materially after the first disclosure of 10b5-1 
trading plan information (see Figure 1).  Therefore, participants likely still prefer non-disclosure because it avoids 
the potential that the earliest trades of each new disclosed plan would be less profitable. 
12
 Because limited disclosure does not provide sufficient plan detail, one cannot infer, ex post, whether an absence of 
trade results from early termination, non-execution due to failure to meet limit orders, or natural plan termination. 
13
 Insiders’ choice to terminate 10b5-1 plans is not observable unless it is voluntarily disclosed (a rare event). 
Therefore, we are not able to examine directly whether limited disclosures are characterized by this specific strategy. 
14
 It seems unlikely that an insider would strategically plan 10b5-1 sales if she possessed reasonably certain positive 
information at plan initiation. 
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Therefore, sales that are executed within specifically disclosed plans should reveal strong patterns of 
strategic trade. 
If disclosure is associated with insiders’ potential for strategic trade, then disclosure may provide 
a price relevant signal to investors. Investors might respond negatively to limited disclosures regarding 
10b5-1 participation, for example, if they infer that insiders have some strategic trade potential for which 
they seek litigation protection. Similarly, investors might respond negatively to specific disclosures 
regarding 10b5-1 participation, if they infer that insiders have high strategic trade potential for which they 
seek the utmost litigation protection. Investors’ response to disclosure will also likely vary with the 
degree to which insiders have access to private information (e.g., insider rank), and with expectations for 
insiders’ trading activity within the plans. Limited reactions to disclosure of plan participation can occur, 
however, if there are frictions to adjusting price conditional on these disclosures or if the market is unable 
to fully understand the implications of these disclosures.
15
 
3.     Sample Selection Procedures 
The sample of participation disclosures are collected from keyword searches for variants of the 
expression “10b5-1” through 8-K filings, business wire reports, and press releases between October 2000 
and December 2006. This keyword search nets 773 firm observations. Additional disclosure observations 
are collected from keyword searches for variants of the expression “10b5-1” through SEC Form 4 filings 
between October 2000 and December 2006.
16
 This keyword search nets an additional 894 firm 
observations. Estimation samples are further constrained by the availability of price and returns data from 
CRSP, insider transaction data from Thomson Financial, institutional ownership data from 
CDA/Spectrum, governance data from Equilar, management forecasts of earnings from First Call 
Company Issued Guidance (CIG) database, and earnings performance data from Compustat.  
Sample disclosures of 10b5-1 plan participation are categorized by each author into limited or 
specific partitions. The disclosure is classified as specific if it delineates the specific terms underlying the 
plan: transaction date(s), transaction volume(s), plan duration, and limit order price (if one exists). Panel 
A of the Appendix provides one example of a disclosure that is classified as specific. If the disclosure 
                                                 
15
 Several frictions are plausible. First, during the period of this study, Rule 10b5-1 was relatively new, and some 
time lag may have been necessary for learning, because the data necessary to draw any conclusions would have only 
been sufficient after a few years. This is especially the case for the “specific” disclosure group, which has fewer than 
100 observations over the entire period. Also, investment in the research necessary to identify this anomaly might 
not have been cost effective. Finally, any investment strategy to capitalize on the anomaly would have required 
holding short positions for 6 months or more, which increases investment risk. 
16
 The SEC mandated electronic Form 4 filings as of June 30, 2003. Unlike previously reported paper filings (which 
are available electronically as image scans), the electronic filings enable global keyword searches. As a result, a 
substantive proportion of the Form 4-generated sample comes from the period subsequent to June 2003. 
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does not delineate the specific terms underlying the plan, the disclosure is categorized as limited.
17
 Panel 
B of the Appendix provides one example of a disclosure that is classified as limited. All Form 4 
disclosures are classified as limited as they generally state that a particular transaction is Rule 10b5-1 
compliant, yet provide no specific details regarding the underlying plan.
18
 This classification procedure 
yields 94 specific and 1,573 limited firm observations that are further constrained for estimation by data 
availability.
19
 
Some analyses require identifying a sample of firms where insiders’ participation in Rule 10b5-1 
is not disclosed.
20
 The non-disclosure sample is inferred from firms where there is no Rule 10b5-1 
participation disclosure, where insiders execute sale transactions within thirty-calendar-day periods that 
precede quarterly earnings announcements, and where the firm does not appear to have previously 
allowed trades to execute in short windows before earnings announcements.
21
 This inference relies on the 
assumption that most firms generally blackout insiders’ trades before earnings announcements, yet allow 
Rule 10b5-1 transactions to bypass blackout restrictions.  
At least two errors can occur from the non-disclosure sample inference algorithm. The first error 
occurs if the non-disclosure sample inadvertently excludes participating firms whose insiders’ 
transactions do not execute shortly before earnings (Type II error). We estimate that our algorithm results 
in a relatively low false negative error rate of 30% when applied to disclosing firms—where plan 
participation is known. If trading outside of pre-earnings windows is typically less strategic (Jagolinzer, 
                                                 
17
 Heterogeneity in disclosure specificity exists within the limited disclosure category. However, attempts to further 
partition limited disclosures along specificity dimensions are inherently ad hoc, because it is unclear, for example, 
whether a disclosure that provides details about the maximum shares tradable within a plan is more or less specific 
than a disclosure that provides details about the approximate timing of transactions within the plan (e.g.,  “shares 
will be traded monthly”). Therefore, our tests do not rely on specificity classifications within the limited group. 
While this choice results in isolating a relatively small set of firms in the specific category, it provides a clean 
delineation between specific and limited disclosure firms, which enhances the power and interpretability of our tests. 
18
 Form 4 disclosures may provide different inferences than other participation disclosures as they follow trades 
made within 10b5-1 plans. Form 4 disclosures are similar to other limited disclosures, however, in that they convey 
that an insider has initiated a plan and that the insider is likely to execute further trade within the plan.  
19
 Using a random sample of 100 limited disclosure firms and all of the specific disclosure firms, we find that the 
decision to disclose 10b5-1 trading plan is “sticky.” Specifically, in untabulated tests, we find during the year 
(second year) following the first full year after initial disclosure that 35% (35%) of limited disclosure firms continue 
to provide limited disclosures through 8-K filings, business wire reports, press releases or Form 4 filings, and that 
19% (14%) move to providing specific disclosures.  In addition, during the year (second year) following the first full 
year after initial disclosure that 19% (14%) of specific disclosure firms continue to provide specific disclosures 
through 8-K filings, business wire reports or press releases, and that 30% (43%) move to providing only limited 
disclosures. 
20
 Jagolinzer (2009) corroborates the existence of firms that choose to not disclose 10b5-1 plan participation, 
through a survey of nearly 2,700 Nasdaq firms. Nearly 18% of the 378 respondent firms report that they had at least 
one insider participate within Rule 10b5-1 between October 2000 and December 2002, yet the firm chose to not 
disclose this information. 
21
 Specifically, firms are excluded if insider trades are observed in pre-earnings windows during the year that 
precedes Rule 10b5-1 promulgation. Bettis, Coles, and Lemmon (2000) show that fewer than 15% of sample firms 
authorize insiders’ trades in the 30 days that precede earnings announcements.  
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Larcker, and Taylor 2011), then false negative error should bias towards documenting an association 
between non-disclosure and strategic trade. 
The second error occurs if the non-disclosure sample inadvertently includes non-participating 
firms whose insiders’ transactions execute shortly before earnings for reasons other than 10b5-1 plan 
execution (Type I error). We estimate that our algorithm results in a relatively low false positive error rate 
of 14% when applied to firms surveyed by Jagolinzer (2009) for their participation in 10b5-1 trading 
plans.
22
 If trading within pre-earnings windows under general counsel approval is typically less strategic 
(Jagolinzer, Larcker, and Taylor 2011), then false positive error should bias against documenting an 
association between non-disclosure and strategic trade. Note that any misclassifications resulting from the 
use of this algorithm only relate to comparisons involving the non-disclosure subsample—i.e., 
comparisons of limited versus specific disclosure subsamples are not affected.
23 
Firms across disclosure specificity groups appear generally similar in size and performance, and 
are modestly larger and more profitable than the general Compustat population during the estimation 
period. For example, the median market value of equity (untabulated) is $625, $745, $603, and $163 
million and return on assets is 3%, 4%, 1.3%, and 1.4% for the non-disclosure, limited-disclosure, 
specific-disclosure, and Compustat population samples, respectively.  
4.     Empirical Analyses 
4.1.  Disclosure Choice 
Because we are generally interested in understanding the relation between voluntary disclosure, 
litigation risk, and insiders’ strategic trade, our first empirical analysis investigates whether the voluntary 
disclosure of 10b5-1 plan participation is more prevalent for firms with high litigation risk, high potential 
for insiders’ strategic trade, board governance, and high demand by outside constituents. We investigate 
firms’ first decisions to disclose participation within Rule 10b5-1 trading plans using the following 
logistic regression model: 
Pr(Discl=1) =  a0 + a1LitRisk + a2Volat + a3InstitOwn + a4LnNumDirs + a5FinExpertDirs  
        + a6InsideDirs + a7LnAnalystFollow + a8MgmtFcst + a9LnMVE + e    (1) 
                                                 
22
 Sixty-eight of the firms from the Jagolinzer (2009) survey (discussed earlier) stated that they did not disclose the 
existence of 10b5-1 plans during the period from October 2000 through December 2002. When we estimate our 
algorithm (i.e., look for the existence of insiders’ sales in short windows before earnings announcements) for all 
firms during this time period, we yield a sample of 79 inferred non-disclosure firms. Eleven of the 79 firms (14%) 
are false positive observations. 
23
 We investigate the sensitivity of our findings to possible classification errors for undisclosed plans. Specifically, 
we randomly replaced 14% of our non-disclosure observations with trades drawn from the population of non-10b5-
1. Our inferences remain unchanged in these (untabulated) tests. We considered an alternative algorithm to identify 
non-disclosed 10b5-1 trades by looking for patterns of systematic trade execution through time (e.g., at regular 
monthly intervals). However, we chose not to pursue this alternative algorithm because it seems less direct than our 
current algorithm and it would likely induce bias in our tests due to systematic trade patterns being uninformed 
(Cohen, Malloy, and Pomorski, 2012). 
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where Discl is a dichotomous variable that equals one if the firm discloses Rule 10b5-1 participation 
details, and zero otherwise; LitRisk is the firm’s expected class action litigation probability estimated in 
the year prior to 10b5-1 participation disclosure (estimated using annual cross-sectional logistic 
regressions following Rogers and Stocken, 2005); Volat is the standard deviation of residuals from a 
regression of firm daily returns on the daily returns to the value-weighted CRSP portfolio in the year prior 
to disclosure (CRSP); InstitOwn is the percentage of institutional firm ownership measured in the year 
prior to disclosure (CDA/Spectrum); LnNumDirs is the natural log of one plus the number of directors on 
the board in the year prior to disclosure (Equilar and hand collected); FinExpertDirs is the ratio of 
financial experts to total board directors in the year prior to disclosure (Corporate Library); InsideDirs is 
the ratio of officer directors to total board directors in the year prior to disclosure (Equilar); 
LnAnalystFollow is the natural log of one plus the number of unique analysts providing forecasts for the 
firm measured in the year prior to disclosure (I/B/E/S); MgmtFcst is a dichotomous variable that equals 
one if the firm issues at least one management earnings forecast during the period and equals zero 
otherwise (First Call); and LnMVE is the natural log of market value of equity in the year prior to 
disclosure (Compustat). 
If firms expect the net benefit from disclosure to be increasing in the expected general litigation 
risk of class action suits then the coefficient for LitRisk should be positive. If firms expect higher 
litigation risk benefits when insiders’ strategic trade potential is greater (which likely increases overall 
litigation risk relative to LitRisk as insiders have better opportunities to profit from private information), 
then the coefficient for Volat should be positive. If large outside investors expect monitoring, plan 
commitment, litigation, or information signaling benefits from disclosure then the coefficient for 
InstitOwn should be positive. If larger boards and more financially sophisticated boards better understand 
the benefits of the disclosure of 10b5-1 trading plans then the coefficients for LnNumDirs and 
FinExpertDirs should be positive. Alternatively, if larger boards are less effective monitors of insiders’ 
activities (e.g., Yermack, 1996) then the coefficient for LnNumDirs should be negative. If insiders expect 
front-running or plan commitment costs from disclosure then the coefficient for InsideDirs should be 
negative. If firms with greater demands for voluntary disclosure are more likely to disclose 10b5-1 plan 
details, then the coefficients for LnAnalystFollow, MgmtFcst and LnMVE should be positive.  
Equation (1) is estimated using disclosure observations, both specific and limited, where the 
fiscal year is the first year in which disclosure is observed between 2001 and 2006, and non-disclosure 
observations where the fiscal year is the first year in which inferred Rule 10b5-1 participation is observed 
between 2001 and 2006 and no disclosure is made. We estimate equation (1) using two specifications. 
The first is a logistic regression that includes all firm-year observations, which compares the disclosure 
firms in the initial plan adoption year against all non-disclosure firm years. The second is an ordered 
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logistic regression, which is similar to the logistic regression specification but allows the disclosure level 
to vary for limited and specific disclosure firms. We include industry and year fixed effects to control for 
prevailing industry and market conditions. 
The two panels of Table 1 report descriptive statistics for the determinants of voluntary disclosure 
of 10b5-1 participation, with comparisons across disclosure groups. Panel B reports univariate statistics 
within disclosure groups and provides evidence that voluntary disclosure of plan participation is more 
common for high litigation risk firms. Specifically, average LitRisk is relatively greater for both the 
specific and limited firms than for the non-disclosure firms (difference = 0.009 and 0.007, t-statistics = 
4.22 and 10.67, respectively). Panel B also provides evidence that voluntary disclosure of plan 
participation is more common for firms with greater stock price volatility, greater institutional ownership, 
smaller boards, more sophisticated boards, less insider dominated boards, greater analyst following, 
greater voluntary disclosure of management earnings guidance, and of smaller size. Specifically, average 
Volat is relatively greater for both the specific and limited firms than for the non-disclosure firms 
(difference = 0.012 and 0.003, t-statistics = 5.62 and 5.13, respectively). In addition, average Volat is 
relatively greater for the specific firms than the limited firms (difference = 0.009, t-statistic = 4.07). 
Average InstitOwn is relatively greater for the limited firms than for the non-disclosure firms (difference 
= 0.077, t-statistic = 7.83).  Average LnNumDirs is relatively lower for the specific and limited firms than 
for the non-disclosure firms (difference = -1.223 and -0.805, t-statistics = -2.66 and -6.85, respectively). 
Average FinExpertDirs is relatively greater for the specific and limited firms than for the non-disclosure 
firms (difference = 0.054 and 0.089, t-statistics = 1.82 and 11.03, respectively). Average InsideDirs is 
relatively lower for the limited firms than the non-disclosure firms (difference = -0.012, t-statistic = -
1.91). Average AnalystFollow is relatively greater for the limited firms than the non-disclosure firms 
(difference = 1.322, t-statistic = 3.87). Average MgmtFcst is relatively greater for both the specific and 
limited firms than for the non-disclosure firms (difference = 0.142 and 0.140, t-statistics = 2.10 and 7.64, 
respectively). Average MVE is relatively lower for the limited firms than for the non-disclosure firms 
(difference = -1,639.521, t-statistic = -1.89). 
The logistic and ordered logistic estimation results are presented in Table 2. We report both 
coefficient estimates and estimates of average marginal effects. Consistent with evidence reported in 
Panel B of Table 1, the results indicate that higher class action litigation risk firms are associated with 
greater disclosure probability of 10b5-1 plan participation (LitRisk Coeffs. = 6.498 and 5.152; z-statistics 
= 2.34 and 1.94).
24
 The results also indicate that firms with higher insider strategic trade potential (i.e., 
                                                 
24
 Results are similar when LitRisk is replaced with an alternative litigation risk proxy, Lawsuit, which is a 
dichotomous variable that equals one if the firm entered a class action lawsuit damage period in the year preceding 
disclosure and that equals zero otherwise. Rogers and Van Buskirk (2009) suggest that firms consider recent 
lawsuits as salient to determining disclosure policy.  
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higher risk that insiders can exploit information when trading within 10b5-1 plans) are more likely to 
disclose 10b5-1 plan participation (Volat Coeffs. = 24.661 and 25.501; z-statistics = 5.84 and 6.74). This 
suggests that firms with higher litigation risk expect benefits from disclosure. In addition, the results 
indicate that firms with more financially sophisticated boards (FinExpertDirs Coeffs. = 0.543 and 0.517; 
z-statistics = 2.48 and 2.41) are more likely to disclose 10b5-1 plan participation.  This suggests that more 
financially sophisticated boards better understand the legal protection provided to insiders’ trade through 
the disclosure of 10b5-1 trading plans. Finally, the results indicate that firms with higher institutional 
ownership (InstitOwn Coeffs. = 0.735 and 0.707; z-statistics = 3.27 and 3.23) and firms with higher 
analyst following (LnAnalystFollow Coeffs = 0.275 and 0.268; z-statistics = 4.24 and 4.22) are more 
likely to disclose 10b5-1 plan participation. This suggests that institutional investors and analysts may 
infer disclosure-related information asymmetry, monitoring, plan commitment, or legal protection 
benefits (Bushee and Noe, 2000; Lang and Lundholm, 1996).  
4.2. Evidence of Strategic Trade 
 The next analyses investigate whether there is a link between the incremental legal protection 
arising from disclosure and insiders’ strategic trade. These analyses are commonly considered by courts 
to assess whether sales by insiders provide circumstantial evidence of scienter in the motion to dismiss 
stage. Specifically, we investigate whether insiders’ trading activity is greater than expected (based on 
historical trade patterns) within 10b5-1 plans and we also investigate whether insiders’ sales within 10b5-
1 plans tend to precede negative return realizations. 
4.2.1. Insider Trading Activity 
A. Univariate Analysis 
Courts might consider trade activity by insiders to be strategic if it seems materially larger than 
the insiders’ prior trading history.  Figure 1 plots the average number of trades per insider surrounding the 
disclosure of insiders’ participation in 10b5-1 trading plans. Because the typical plan length is 12 months, 
our analysis focuses on the 12 months after disclosure, with month 0 being the month of first disclosure. 
Stock transactions include both insiders’ sales and purchases; however, the transactions are almost 
exclusively insider sales. For non-disclosure firms, a first-pseudo-disclosure date is identified as the 
sixtieth calendar day that precedes the first observed within-blackout-window transaction. Because the 
typical disclosure happens within a month (rather than at the beginning or end of a month), month 0 
includes trades before and after the actual disclosure during the month. 
 Figure 1, Panels A, B and C all show that the average number of trades per insider increases 
materially following the first disclosure of 10b5-1 trading plan information (or following the first-pseudo-
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disclosure date for non-disclosure firms).
25
 These trading patterns are consistent with abnormal selling 
activity by insiders following disclosure, with the greatest increase in the number of trades occurring in 
month 0. The Figure 1 panels also show that the average number of trades per insider is increasing with 
disclosure specificity, with the largest increase in the average number of trades per insider making 
specific disclosures. In addition, the Figure 1 panels show that the abnormal trading remains elevated for 
six to eight months following disclosure, and then returns to a more typical level. 
 To provide an alternative comparison group that uses a firm as its own control, Figure 2, Panels A 
and B present the insider trading patterns for non-participants at firms that have disclosed details about 
10b5-1 plans during the same time periods as Figure 1. The panels fail to show a similar increase in 
trading activity following disclosure by non-participants. In addition, the panels also fail to show that 
trading activity by non-participants is increasing with disclosure specificity. 
B. Negative binomial regression analysis 
Table 3 formally tests the association between the number of insider transactions and disclosure 
specificity for plan participants and compares trading patterns relative to non-participants using the 
following negative binomial regression model: 
NumTrades = l0 + l1 Lim_Partic + l2 Spc_Partic + l3 Lim_NonPartic  
              + l4 Spc_NonPartic + e.        (2) 
where Lim designates observations from the limited disclosure sample and Spc designates observations 
from the specific disclosure sample.  Partic designates observations that are participants in 10b5-1 trading 
plans and NonPartic designates observations that are not participants in 10b5-1 trading plans.
26
 Non-
disclosure firm observations are from the inferred non-disclosure sample and are captured by the 
intercept. We use a negative binomial regression model rather than ordinary least squares because our 
dependent variable is a count measure (e.g., the number of times insider trades occur).  We report z-
statistics based on standard errors clustered by firm because some firms have multiple insiders trading. 
Table 3 indicates that the average number of trades per insider after disclosure is relatively higher 
for limited and specific disclosure firms than for non-disclosure firms, but is even higher for specific 
disclosure firms. For instance, during the shortest measurement window of 0 to 3 months following 
                                                 
25
 The observed spike in the number of trades in Panel C is mechanically linked to how we identify and construct the 
non-disclosure sample.  Specifically, we identify the non-disclosure sample by isolating insiders who execute sale 
transactions within 30 calendar days before quarterly earnings announcements.  We then use the sixtieth calendar 
day that precedes the first observed pre-earnings trade as a first-pseudo-disclosure date.  This method biases towards 
observing spikes in trading activity subsequent to the first-pseudo-disclosure date. This issue should not materially 
affect our investigation of returns performance following these transactions because it is not clear, ex ante, whether 
these transactions should systematically predict a major news event. 
26
 Some prior studies that investigate the determinants of the number of trades executed by insiders (e.g., Bettis, 
Coles, and Lemmon, 2000) include the market-to-book ratio and stock price volatility to control for information 
asymmetry between insiders and investors.  We exclude these variables because Lim and Spc are intended to capture 
such information asymmetry. 
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disclosure, limited and specific disclosure insiders trade more than non-disclosure insiders (Lim and Spc 
Marginal Effects = 0.323 and 0.8490, z-statistics = 6.69 and 3.67, respectively), but specific disclosure 
insiders trade more than limited disclosure insiders (Spc – Lim Marg. Effect = 0.526, z-statistic = 2.30). 
Table 3 also indicates that the average number of trades per insider for non-participants from 
limited and specific firms is relatively lower than for participants from non-disclosure firms, and 
relatively lower than for participants from the same respective firms. For instance, during the window of 0 
to 3 months following disclosure, non-participants from limited and specific disclosure firms trade less 
than participants from non-disclosure firms (Lim_NonPartic and Spc_NonPartic Marg. Effects = -1.698 
and -1.143, z-statistics = -50.23 and -2.88, respectively). In addition, non-participants trade less than 
participants from the same limited and specific disclosure firms [(Lim_Partic – Lim_NonPartic) and 
(Spc_Partic – Spc_NonPartic) Marg. Effects = -2.021 and -1.992, z-statistics = -41.64 and -5.10, 
respectively]. Results during longer measurement windows are similar. Taken together, this evidence 
suggest that insiders view participation in and disclosure of 10b5-1 trading plans as providing incremental 
legal protection, and that more specific disclosure provides even greater legal protection. 
4.2.2. Returns Performance 
A. Univariate Analysis 
Figure 3 plots the cumulative abnormal return relative to the timing of insiders’ sales that are 
executed after the first disclosure of insiders’ participation within the Rule. Returns analyses focus 
exclusively on insiders’ sale transactions because sales comprise nearly all transactions executed within 
Rule 10b5-1 and there are no specific disclosure observations associated with pending insider purchases. 
Specifically, Figure 3 cumulates the market adjusted firm returns (daily firm return – the daily return to 
the value-weighted CRSP portfolio) from day – 30 to day + 30 relative to each insider transaction day 
(executed on day 0) during the one-year period that follows the insider’s first participation disclosure.27 
For non-disclosure firms, a first-pseudo-disclosure date is identified as the sixtieth calendar day that 
precedes the first observed within-blackout-window transaction.
28,29
  
Figure 3, Panels A, B, and C all show that 10b5-1 sales trades tend to follow positive market-
adjusted returns. These patterns are consistent with some 10b5-1 sales being triggered by limit order 
                                                 
27
 For all non-disclosure and most limited disclosure observations, it is not possible to discern the length of 10b5-1 
plans. A typical disclosed plan length is 12 months, so we assume that trades made within 12 months following plan 
disclosure are pursuant to the Rule. Misclassification of observed trades likely induces noise to our tests. 
28
 For disclosure firms (excluding Form 4 disclosures), the average number of days between disclosure and the first 
observed trade is 53. The median number of days is 17. Results are not sensitive to denoting the first-pseudo-
disclosure date as the thirtieth calendar day that precedes the first observed within-blackout-window transaction.  
29
 We do not estimate participant versus non-participant comparisons for our tests of insider trade returns (similar to 
Jagolinzer, 2009), because there are too few insiders in the specific disclosure group and there is also considerable 
overlap in the timing of trades executed by participants and nonparticipants during our one-month trading windows. 
 16 
formulas.
30
 Panel A also shows that sales trades that follow specific disclosure are associated with 
negative market-adjusted returns subsequent to the transaction. Relatedly, Panel B shows that sales trades 
that follow limited disclosure are also associated with modest negative market-adjusted returns 
subsequent to the transaction. Finally, Panel C shows that sales trades that follow non-disclosure do not 
appear to be associated with negative subsequent market-adjusted returns. A comparison of post-trade 
returns slopes across Figure 3 panels suggests that the degree to which sale transactions are associated 
with negative performance is increasing in Rule 10b5-1 plan disclosure specificity.
31
  
B. Portfolio and Multivariate Analysis 
We formally test the association between trade returns and disclosure specificity in Table 4 using 
a calendar-month portfolio estimation of monthly returns regressed on factors known to explain monthly 
returns (Fama and French, 1993; Carhart, 1997). Our approach follows the portfolio estimation method 
suggested by Mitchell and Stafford (2000), to control for potential contemporaneous cross-sectional 
correlation. Specifically, within each disclosure category, monthly portfolios are formed between January 
2001 and July 2007 if a 10b5-1 sales transaction is observed in the preceding calendar month, the 
preceding three calendar months, or the preceding six calendar months (e.g., Jaffe, 1974; Mandelker, 
1974; Fama, 1998; Mitchell and Stafford, 2000). Note that less powerful tests are expected the longer the 
window an insider sales transaction is observed, due to the disclosure signal of an insider’s sales 
transaction losing salience over time (Jaffe, 1974). If at least three firms are available to form a 
disclosure-month-portfolio, the following regression is estimated:  
 (3) 
where Rport is the equally-weighted monthly portfolio return, Rf is the one-month treasury bill rate, Rm is 
the value-weighted monthly market return, and SMB, HML, and UMD are the monthly small-minus-big, 
high-minus-low, and momentum factors that explain monthly stock returns (Fama and French, 1993; 
Carhart, 1997, data from CRSP and from Ken French’s website as provided through WRDS). 
                                                 
30
 Several disclosed 10b5-1 plans delineate minimum price floor limits to trigger transactions. Some disclosed plans 
also delineate graduated limits that trigger incremental sales volume when higher price thresholds are realized. 
Results from simple random walk simulations (not tabulated) show that pre-sales “run-up” returns are biased 
upwards as limit order prices are increased. 
31
 Sen (2008) criticizes univariate results, related to those in Figure 3, that were presented in early working paper 
versions that preceded the published Jagolinzer (2009) paper. The results presented in this paper and in Jagolinzer 
(2009) are robust to this criticism (e.g., Jagolinzer 2009, footnotes 34 and 37).  Jagolinzer (2009) and this paper find 
evidence of informed trade when using tests that do not rely on the aggregation techniques criticized by Sen (2008).  
Sen (2008) does not utilize the sample derived in Jagolinzer (2009 and prior versions), specifically omitting all Rule 
10b5-1 trade plans voluntarily disclosed in proxy statements, press releases and 8-Ks. This reduces his sample by 
over 26%, which significantly weakens the power of his tests. Further, the sample selection rule could eliminate the 
most strategic trades (i.e., those that are difficult to follow because of the high costs of collecting plan information). 
 
R
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Consistent with evidence presented in Figure 3, results in the first three columns of Table 4 
indicate that more specific 10b5-1 plan disclosures are associated with more negative post-trade abnormal 
returns, particularly within the first few months that follow transactions. That is, for the one month 
following insiders’ transactions, Table 4 indicates that post-trade abnormal returns are statistically more 
negative as disclosure becomes more specific. Formal tests comparing portfolio returns indicate that one 
month average post-trade abnormal returns are more negative for the limited-disclosure portfolio relative 
to the non-disclosure portfolio (-0.010, t-statistic = -1.86), for the specific-disclosure portfolio relative to 
the non-disclosure portfolio (-0.041, t-statistic = -4.08), and for the specific-disclosure portfolio relative to 
the limited-disclosure portfolio (-0.031, t-statistic = -3.04). Table 4 also indicates a similar, but not 
surprisingly weakened, pattern when examining the average one-month abnormal return when an 
insiders’ transaction is observed within the three-month window that precedes the calendar month. Over 
this window, average one-month post-trade abnormal returns are statistically more negative for the 
limited-disclosure portfolio relative to the non-disclosure portfolio (-0.011, t-statistic = -2.04), for the 
specific-disclosure portfolio relative to the non-disclosure portfolio (-0.024, t-statistic = -2.83), and for the 
specific-disclosure portfolio relative to the limited-disclosure portfolio (-0.013, t-statistic = -1.62). Table 
4 further indicates an even weaker pattern in the average one-month abnormal return when an insiders’ 
transaction is observed within an expanded six-month window that precedes the calendar month. This can 
be seen by the smaller magnitude average one month abnormal returns and the smaller magnitude 
differences in returns across disclosure partitions. Finally, because non-Form 4 disclosures of 10b5-1 
trading are more proactive than waiting for a transaction and disclosing 10b5-1 participation, we 
separately analyze post-trade abnormal returns after excluding Form 4 disclosure firms. Results in the last 
three columns of Table 4 are consistent with those examining all trades; however, significance levels are 
somewhat lower which may be attributable to examining a reduced sample of trades. 
4.2.3.   Earnings and Price Relevant News  
To better understand what may economically underlie insiders’ strategic trade, we examine the 
association between 10b5-1 transaction timing and forthcoming news events that reveal fundamental 
economic information about the firm (e.g., earnings). Untabulated results suggest that the first sales 
transaction executed under both limited and specific disclosures are associated with a significant decline 
in earnings performance relative to market expectations.  
We also find that specific disclosures are associated with subsequent negative news events that 
may not be impounded in short-term earnings. For example, approximately 25% of the specific disclosure 
sample exhibits a single news event, not related to earnings, for which the three-day market adjusted 
return falls between -10% and -75%, within an average 140 calendar days of disclosure. These news 
events include exchange-imposed stock trade suspension, drug trial failure, and announcement of the 
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intent to acquire another firm. We also find that approximately 33% of the remaining specific disclosure 
sample exhibit sustained returns declines (between –20% and –80%), for which there is no obvious 
associated information event, during the 180 calendar days that follow disclosure. Collectively, this 
evidence suggests that Rule 10b5-1 trades tend to be associated with fundamental firm economic shifts.  
4.2.4 Investors’ Response to 10b5-1 Disclosure 
The ability of insiders to retain trade profitability subsequent to voluntarily disclosing information 
regarding insiders’ pending trades depends, in part, on investors’ inability to fully impound potentially 
price relevant information from disclosure. To assess how investors impound these voluntary disclosures, 
we estimate three day market-adjusted returns centered on the first firm announcement date regarding 
pending 10b5-1 sales plans. We market-adjust returns by subtracting the same period return to the value-
weighted CRSP portfolio, and analyze the market response to disclosure as a function of information 
detailed in the disclosure. Specifically, we estimate the following regression for the sample of first 
participation announcements (excluding all initial announcements made through Form 4 disclosures): 
    MktAdjRet =  f0 + f1 Spc + f2 CEOCB + f3 CFO + f4 LnNumExecs + f5 LnPriorNumTrades + z.  (4) 
MktAdjRet is the three day cumulative firm return centered on the announcement date minus the three day 
return to the value weighted CRSP portfolio, Spc is a dichotomous variable that equals one if the 
disclosure is categorized as specific and equals zero otherwise, CEOCB is a dichotomous variable that 
equals one if the disclosure names a Board Chairman or Chief Executive Officer participant and equals 
zero otherwise, CFO is a dichotomous variable that equals one if the disclosure names a Chief Financial 
Officer participant and equals zero otherwise, LnNumExecs equals the log of one plus the number of 
insiders named in the disclosure as participants, and LnPriorNumTrades equals the log of one plus the 
cumulative number of insider transaction days in the year that precedes the announcement event. 
We observe that the average market adjusted return centered on the announcement date 
(untabulated) is not significant (-0.215%; t-statistic = -0.96). For equation (4), we observe (untabulated) 
that the announcement of a CEO or Chairman participating in a plan yields a lower average return of -
0.8% (t-statistic = -1.69). In addition, investors tend to respond more negatively to participation 
announcements when expected trade is greater (LnPriorNumTrades = -0.004; t-statistic = -1.76), with 
lower average returns of -1.1% for a one standard deviation increase for the number of trades, i.e., -0.004 
* Ln(16.950). Other coefficient estimates are not significant. Collectively, this evidence suggests that 
investors infer strategic trade potential from these announcements, but that the reaction is fairly limited. 
4.2.5 Sensitivity Analysis for Potential Selection Bias 
Disclosure choice could correlate with unobserved factors (e.g., insiders’ control over firm 
decisions or access to material information) that can influence observed post-trade returns patterns, 
irrespective of disclosure. Accordingly, the possibility exists that we inappropriately attribute observed 
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results to disclosure choice when, in fact, they evolve from an unobserved characteristic that are 
correlated with disclosure choice. To investigate this possibility, we first assess whether average 
abnormal return estimates are sensitive to insiders’ frequency of trade or rank, with the expectation that 
returns could be more negative following higher trade frequency and higher-level executive 
transactions.
32
 Because insider trade frequency and rank are measured at the firm-level, we conduct this 
analysis using a firm-level calendar-time regression (Cheng, Nagar, and Rajan, 2007), that is similar to a 
disaggregated Mitchell and Stafford (2000) portfolio estimation method.
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 Following Cheng, Nagar, and 
Rajan (2007), we regress firm-level value-weighted CRSP market-adjusted monthly returns on the firm’s 
book-to-market ratio, its prior return, its prior volatility, and industry fixed effects. We also include the 
number of insiders’ sale transactions during the preceding month and indicator variables that equal one if 
the firm’s CEO or CFO traded in the prior month. Standard errors are adjusted through month clustering 
(Gow, Ormazabal, and Taylor, 2010). Untabulated results show that our results continue to indicate that 
abnormal trade returns increase in disclosure specificity after controlling for insider trade frequency and 
rank. Specifically, abnormal returns estimates for non-disclosure, limited-disclosure, and specific-
disclosure firm months are -0.013 (t-statistic = -3.52), -0.022 (t-statistic = -4.65), and -0.043 (t-statistic = -
3.30), respectively. Abnormal returns are statistically more negative for the limited-disclosure portfolio 
relative to the non-disclosure portfolio (-0.009, t-statistic = -2.52), for the specific-disclosure portfolio 
relative to the non-disclosure portfolio (-0.030, t-statistic = -2.54), and for the specific-disclosure portfolio 
relative to the limited-disclosure portfolio (-0.021, t-statistic = -1.73). 
In addition, we investigate whether observed returns patterns (and differences across disclosure 
partitions) exist for insiders’ trades during the twelve-month period ending a year prior to being identified 
as participating in a 10b5-1 plan. If disclosure choice inadvertently proxies for an omitted characteristic 
(e.g., insiders’ ability to predict or influence future performance), then presumably patterns should be 
consistent through time. Results from estimating equation (3) during the pre-10b5-1 time period 
(untabulated) fail to provide evidence of strategic selling behavior for insiders in any of the disclosure 
partitions, and fail to provide evidence of trade profitability differences across the disclosure partitions. 
This mitigates the likelihood that the observed patterns are induced by self-selection.  
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 We also assess whether the relation between average abnormal returns and disclosure specificity is stronger when 
insiders’ trade frequency or rank is higher. In untabulated tests, coefficients of interactions between disclosure 
specificity and insider trade frequency or rank are insignificant.  
33
 The firm-level estimation is relatively more powerful than the portfolio method, which relies on aggregation (see 
Cheng, Nagar, and Rajan, 2007 for a discussion), and explicitly controls for differences in book to market ratios 
across firms, which has been shown to explain insiders’ sales returns (Lakonishok and Lee, 2001). The approach 
also implicitly controls for firm size (Lakonishok and Lee, 2001) because firms in the different disclosure partitions 
are of similar size. 
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Self-selection could also affect our cross-sectional analysis of the markets' reaction to the 
announcement of plan 10b5-1 participation, as the market could ex ante predict which firms and insiders 
will disclose 10b5-1 participation. We investigate this possibility following Heckman (1979) by 
estimating equation (4) with an inverse-Mills ratio constructed using the predicted probabilities from our 
estimation of equation (1). Our inferences are not affected using this alternative regression specification. 
5.     Conclusion 
This study investigates whether disclosure can be used to enhance insiders’ strategic trade, which 
is inconsistent with conventional wisdom derived from prior literature that suggests disclosure reduces 
information asymmetries. This might occur because the legal rules of civil procedure can provide more 
legal protection at the motion to dismiss phase of litigation when disclosure is higher, which may alter 
insiders’ trading incentives. 
We provide evidence that a firm’s decision to disclose 10b5-1 trading plan information is 
increasing in firms’ litigation risk and in insiders’ strategic trade potential, suggesting that firms infer 
legal benefits from disclosure. We also provide evidence that a firm’s decision to disclose is increasing in 
the board sophistication and when institutional ownership and analyst following are higher, suggesting 
that boards respond with more disclosure when they better understand the legal benefits and when there is 
greater outside demand. In addition, we provide evidence that insider selling increases more and that 
insiders’ sale transactions are associated with greater subsequent declines in fundamental economic and 
stock returns performance for disclosed plans, which suggests that disclosure is associated with strategic 
insider trading. Finally, we provide evidence that this strategic trading behavior is increasing in disclosure 
specificity, suggesting that disclosure enhances insiders’ strategic trade opportunities.  
Overall, these results suggest, in the 10b5-1 setting, that disclosure provides value to a “hiding in 
plain sight” strategy because of its incremental legal protection. This evidence expands our understanding 
of the trade-offs relating to voluntary disclosure, litigation risk, and insider trading. In addition, this 
evidence potentially offers important insights to court, the SEC and other governance bodies. Because 
enhanced disclosure appears associated with more strategic trade by insiders, courts might, for example, 
consider more carefully whether 10b5-1 disclosure mitigates scienter. 
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Appendix 
Example 10b5-1 Plan Disclosures 
 
Panel A: Specific  
Excerpts from PepsiAmericas Inc. Form 8-K, Filed March 3, 2005 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Limited  
Excerpt from Ariba Inc. Form 8-K, Filed June 16, 2006 
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Figure 1 
Average Number of Trades per Insider Following Disclosure of 10b5-1 Trading Plans: Participants 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This figure plots the average number of insiders’ trades by disclosure type in the months surrounding the first 
disclosure of participants’ plans between 2001 and 2006.   
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Figure 2 
Average Number of Trades per Insider Following Disclosure of 10b5-1 Trading Plans: 
Non-Participants  
 
 
 
 
 
 
This figure plots the average number of insiders’ trades by disclosure type for insiders not participating in the 10b5-
1 trading plans in the months surrounding the first disclosure of  participants’ plans between 2001 and 2006.   
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Figure 3 
Cumulative Abnormal Return Relative to Sale Transactions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This figure plots the average cumulative abnormal return relative to insiders’ sale transactions within Rule 10b5-1. 
Each firm’s cumulative abnormal return is computed as CARt = , where Rf is the firm’s daily 
return, RVWCRSP is the daily return to the CRSP value weighted portfolio, and t denotes a specific day relative to the 
transaction date. Trade-day observations = 1,108 specific, 23,040 limited, and 20,818 non-disclosure.
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Panel C.  Non-disclosure sales 
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Table 1 
Determinants of 10b5-1 Plan Participation Disclosure 
 
Panel A: Summary statistics 
           
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev.  25%  50%  75% 
LitRisk  0.015  0.018  0.006  0.009  0.016 
Volat  0.027  0.016  0.016  0.023  0.034 
InstitOwn  0.526  0.268  0.311  0.555  0.751 
LnNumDirs  9.159  3.204  7.000  9.000  11.000 
FinExpertDirs  0.624  0.290  0.455  0.625  0.777 
InsideDirs  0.364  0.166  0.250  0.348  0.455 
AnalystFollow (#)  9.291  9.265  2.000  7.000  13.000 
MgmtFcst  0.460  0.499  0.000  0.000  1.000 
MVE ($million)  5,007.321  23,522.18  237.510  679.501  2,399.411 
 
Panel B. Statistics by disclosure type           
           
  None  Lim  Spc  Spc - None  Lim - None  Spc - Lim 
             
Variable 
 Mean 
 
 
Mean 
 
 
Mean 
 
 
Mean 
(t-stat) 
 
Mean 
(t-stat) 
 
Mean 
(t-stat) 
LitRisk 
 
0.013 
 
 
0.020 
 
 
0.022 
 
 
0.009 
(4.22) 
 
0.007 
(10.67) 
 
0.002 
(0.93) 
             
Volat 
 
0.026 
 
 
0.029 
 
 
0.038 
 
 
0.012 
(5.62) 
 
0.003 
(5.13) 
 
0.09 
(4.07) 
             
InstitOwn 
 
0.505 
 
 
0.582 
 
 
0.529 
 
 
0.024 
(0.64) 
 
0.077 
(7.83) 
 
-0.053 
(-1.44) 
             
LnNumDirs 
 
9.387 
 
 
8.581 
 
 
8.164 
 
 
-1.223 
(-2.66) 
 
-0.806 
(-6.85) 
 
-0.417 
(-0.95) 
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FinExpertDirs 
 
 
0.600 
 
 
0.689 
 
 
0.654 
 
 
0.054 
(1.82) 
 
0.089 
(11.03) 
 
-0.018 
(-1.14) 
             
             
InsideDirs 
 
0.366 
 
 
0.354 
 
 
0.372 
 
 
0.012 
(0.54) 
 
-0.012 
(-1.91) 
 
0.024 
(1.03) 
             
             
AnalystFollow (#) 
 
 
8.929 
 
 
10.251 
 
 
10.073 
 
 
1.144 
(0.90) 
 
1.322 
(3.87) 
 
-0.179 
(-0.14) 
             
MgmtFcst  0.422    0.562  0.564  0.142  0.140  0.002 
        (2.10)  (7.64)  (0.03) 
             
MVE ($million) 
 
5,490.160 
 
 
3,850.639 
 
 
1,703.048 
 
 
-3,787.112 
(-1.06) 
 
-1,639.521 
(-1.89) 
 
-2,147.591 
(-0.68) 
This table provides summary statistics (Panel A) and univariate comparisons (Panel B) of the determinants of firms’ decisions to disclose participation in 10b5-1 
plans. Comparisons are made in the year of first disclosure for disclosing firms and in the first year of inferred 10b5-1 trade for non-disclosing firms. LitRisk is 
the firm’s expected class action litigation probability estimated in the year prior to 10b5-1 participation disclosure; Volat is the standard deviation of residuals 
from a regression of daily firm returns on daily value-weighted CRSP portfolio returns in the year prior to disclosure (CRSP); InstitOwn is the percentage of 
institutional firm ownership (CDA/Spectrum) in the year prior to disclosure; NumDirs is the number of directors on the board in the year prior to disclosure 
(Equilar and hand collected); FinExpertDirs is the ratio of financial experts to total board directors in the year prior to disclosure (Corporate Library); InsideDirs 
is the ratio of officer directors to total board directors in the year prior to disclosure (Equilar); AnalystFollow is the number of unique analysts providing forecasts 
for the firm measured in the year prior to disclosure (I/B/E/S); MgmtFcst is a dichotomous variable equal to one if the management issued at least one revenue or 
earnings forecast during the period and equals zero otherwise (First Call); and MVE is the market value of equity in the year prior to disclosure (Compustat). 
LitRisk is estimated from the following annual cross-sectional logistic regression [similar to Rogers and Stocken (2005)]: Pr (DMGPd = 1) = g0 + g1 MinReturn + 
g2 SkewReturn + g3 StdDevRet + g4 Turnover + g5 Log(MVE) + g6 BHReturn + g7 Beta + g8 BiotechInd + g9 CompHWInd + g10 CompSWInd + g11 ElecInd + g12 
RetailInd + e, where DMGPd equals one if the fiscal year falls within an alleged class action damage period (data provided by Woodruff Sawyer and Co.) and 
equals zero otherwise; MinReturn is the minimum single day firm return during the fiscal year; SkewReturn is the skewness of daily returns during the fiscal year; 
StdDevRet is the standard deviation of residuals from a regression of daily firm returns on daily value-weighted CRSP portfolio returns; Turnover is the average 
daily trade volume scaled by shares outstanding during the fiscal year; MVE is the average market value of equity during the fiscal year; BHReturn is the prior 
fiscal year’s buy and hold return; Beta is the firm’s beta coefficient from a regression of daily firm returns on daily market returns; and BiotechInd, CompHWInd, 
CompSWInd, ElecInd, and RetailInd are dichotomous variables that equal one if the firm represents the biotechnology, computer hardware, computer software, 
electric, or retail industries, and equal zero otherwise. 
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Table 2 
Determinants of 10b5-1 Plan Participation Disclosure 
 
  
  Logit Regression   Ordered Logit Regression 
        
  Pr(Discl = 1)   Pr(Discl = 1, 2) 
        
 
 
 
 
 
Exp. 
Sign 
 
 
Coeff. 
(z-stat) 
 
Marg.  
Effect 
(z-stat) 
 
 
 
Coeff. 
(z-stat) 
Marg. 
Effect 
Lim 
(z-stat) 
Marg. 
Effect 
Spc 
(z-stat) 
        
LitRisk 
 
+ 
 
6.498 
(2.34) 
1.006 
(2.34) 
 
5.152 
(1.94) 
0.739 
(1.94) 
0.070 
(1.89) 
        
Volat + 
 
24.661 
(5.84) 
3.817 
(5.92) 
 
25.501 
(6.74) 
3.656 
(6.27) 
0.346 
(4.85) 
        
InstitOwn 
 
+ 
 
0.735 
(3.27) 
0.114 
(3.28) 
 
0.707 
(3.23) 
0.101 
(3.24) 
0.010 
(2.99) 
        
LnNumDirs 
 
+/- 
 
-0.157 
(-0.76) 
-0.024 
(-0.76) 
 
-0.151 
(-0.74) 
-0.022 
(-0.74) 
-0.002 
(-0.74) 
        
        
FinExpertDirs 
 
+ 
 
0.543 
(2.48) 
0.084 
(2.49) 
 
0.517 
(2.41) 
0.074 
(2.42) 
0.007 
(2.30) 
        
        
InsideDirs 
 
- 
 
0.175 
(0.62) 
0.027 
(0.62) 
 
0.195 
(0.71) 
0.028 
(0.48) 
0.003 
(0.71) 
        
        
LnAnalystFollow 
 
+ 
 
0.275 
(4.24) 
0.043 
(4.27) 
 
0.268 
(4.22) 
0.038 
(4.25) 
0.004 
(3.72) 
        
MgmtFcst + 0.145 0.022  0.140 0.020 0.002 
  (1.54) (1.54)  (1.51) (1.51) (1.49) 
        
LnMVE 
 
+ 
 
0.014 
(0.32) 
0.002 
(0.32) 
 
0.019 
(0.46) 
0.003 
(0.46) 
0.000 
(0.46) 
        
Cut 1 
 
 
 
-  -   
3.898 
(2.55) 
-  -  
        
Cut 2 
 
  - -   
7.561 
(6.185) 
-  -  
 
       
Fixed Effects   Ind, Year     Ind, Year 
Num obs None   2,760     2,760 
Num obs Lim   995     995 
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Num obs Spc   55     55 
Pseudo R
2
   0.194     0.170 
 
       
This table provides logistic and ordered regressions of the determinants of firms’ decisions to disclose 
participation in 10b5-1 plans. Comparisons are made in the year of first disclosure for disclosing firms and in 
the first year of inferred 10b5-1 trade for non-disclosing firms. Results are based on estimating: Pr (Discl = 1 
or 1, 2) =a0 + a1 LitRisk + a2 Volat + a3 InstitOwn +a4 LnNumDirs +a5 FinExpertDirs +a6 InsideDirs + a7 
LnAnalystFollow + a8 MgmtFcst + a9 LnMVE +e, where Discl is a dichotomous variable that equals one if 
the firm discloses Rule 10b5-1 participation details (or one if the firm discloses limited plan details and two if 
the firm discloses specific plan details), and zero otherwise; LitRisk is the firm’s expected class action 
litigation probability estimated in the year prior to 10b5-1 participation disclosure; Volat is the standard 
deviation of residuals from a regression of daily firm returns on daily value-weighted CRSP portfolio returns 
in the year prior to disclosure (CRSP); InstitOwn is the percentage of institutional firm ownership 
(CDA/Spectrum) in the year prior to disclosure; NumDirs is the number of directors on the board in the year 
prior to disclosure (Equilar and hand collected); FinExpertDirs is the ratio of financial experts to total board 
directors in the year prior to disclosure (Corporate Library); InsideDirs is the ratio of officer directors to total 
board directors in the year prior to disclosure (Equilar); AnalystFollow is the number of unique analysts 
providing forecasts for the firm measured in the year prior to disclosure (I/B/E/S); MgmtFcst is a 
dichotomous variable equal to one if the management issued at least one revenue or earnings forecast during 
the period and equals zero otherwise (First Call); and MVE is the market value of equity in the year prior to 
disclosure (Compustat). LitRisk is estimated from the following annual cross-sectional logistic regression 
[similar to Rogers and Stocken (2005)]: Pr (DMGPd = 1) = g0 + g1 MinReturn + g2 SkewReturn + g3 
StdDevRet + g4 Turnover + g5 Log(MVE) + g6 BHReturn + g7 Beta + g8 BiotechInd + g9 CompHWInd + g10 
CompSWInd + g11 ElecInd + g12 RetailInd + e, where DMGPd equals one if the fiscal year falls within an 
alleged class action damage period (data provided by Woodruff Sawyer and Co.) and equals zero otherwise; 
MinReturn is the minimum single day firm return during the fiscal year; SkewReturn is the skewness of daily 
returns during the fiscal year; StdDevRet is the standard deviation of residuals from a regression of daily firm 
returns on daily value-weighted CRSP portfolio returns; Turnover is the average daily trade volume scaled by 
shares outstanding during the fiscal year; MVE is the average market value of equity during the fiscal year; 
BHReturn is the prior fiscal year’s buy and hold return; Beta is the firm’s beta coefficient from a regression of 
daily firm returns on daily market returns; and BiotechInd, CompHWInd, CompSWInd, ElecInd, and RetailInd 
are dichotomous variables that equal one if the firm represents the biotechnology, computer hardware, 
computer software, electric, or retail industries, and equal zero otherwise. The variables LnNumDirs and 
LnAnalystFollow as constructed as the natural log of one plus the number of directors and analysts following 
the firm, respectively. Column 1 presents logistic regression results with fixed industry and year effects. 
Column 2 presents ordered logistic regression results with fixed industry and year effects..
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Table 3 
Average Number of Trades per Insider by Disclosure Type:  
Participants and Non-Participants 
  
 0 to 3 months 0 to 6 month 0 to 12 months 
 
  NumTrades  
 
 Exp. Marg. Effect Marg. Effect Marg. Effect 
 Sign (z-stat) (z-stat) (z-stat)  
Lim_Partic + 0.323 0.786 1.617 
  (6.69) (9.63) (12.02) 
 
Spc_Partic + 0.849 1.683 2.933 
  (3.67) (4.70) (5.76) 
 
Lim_NonPartic - -1.698 -2.184 -2.537 
  (-50.23) (-36.30) (-24.84) 
 
Spc_NonPartic - -1.143 -1.186 -0.914 
  (-2.88) (-2.02) (-1.03) 
 
Coefficient Comparisons 
 
Spc_Partic – Lim_Partic + 0.526 0.898 1.315 
  (2.30) (2.55) (2.66) 
 
Lim_NonPartic – Lim_Partic - -2.021 -2.970 -4.154 
  (-41.64) (-40.21) (-37.43) 
 
Spc_NonPartic – Spc_Partic - -1.992 -2.870 -3.846 
  (-5.10) (-4.79) (-4.43) 
  
Num obs None 6,615 6,615 6,615 
Num obs Lim_Partic 3,489 3,489 3,489 
Num obs Spc_Partic 65 65 65 
Num obs Lim_NonPartic 17,139 17,139 17,139 
Num obs Spc_NonPartic 339 339 339 
Wald c
2 
(4)  1,077.98 1,129.81 1,208.14  
 
This table provides negative binomial regressions of the number of trades by type of 10b5-1 trading plan 
disclosure following the first observed disclosure between 2001 and 2006. Comparisons are made in the 
year of first disclosure for disclosing firms and in the first year of inferred 10b5-1 trade for non-disclosing 
firms. None designates observations from the inferred-non disclosure sample, and is captured by the 
intercept (not reported). Lim designates observations from the limited disclosure sample. Spc designates 
observations from the specific disclosure sample. Partic designates observations that are participants in 
10b5-1 trading plans. NonPartic designates observations that are not participants in 10b5-1 trading plans. 
Reported z-statistics are based on standard errors clustered by firm. 
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Table 4 
Calendar Time Portfolio Returns 
  
 All Trades Excluding Form 4 Trades   
 Rport – Rf Rport – Rf  
 1-mo 3-mo 6-mo 1-mo 3-mo 6-mo 
None -0.002 
(-0.26) 
-0.001 
(-0.17) 
-0.001 
(-0.16) 
-0.002 
(-0.26) 
-0.001 
(-0.14) 
-0.001 
(-0.21) 
       
Lim  -0.012 
(-1.86) 
-0.012 
(-2.04) 
-0.009 
(-1.56) 
-0.011 
(-1.78) 
-0.011 
(-1.63) 
-0.007 
(-1.08) 
       
Spc -0.043 
(-5.27) 
-0.025 
(-3.77) 
-0.013 
(-2.18) 
-0.035 
(-4.59) 
-0.021 
(-2.86) 
-0.015 
(-2.14) 
       
Rm -Rf 1.242 
(9.42) 
1.012 
(8.90) 
0.990 
(8.69) 
1.198 
(9.29) 
1.044 
(8.00) 
1.072 
(8.42) 
       
SMB 0.859 
(6.21) 
0.913 
(7.66) 
0.854 
(7.11) 
0.774 
(5.70) 
0.839 
(6.13) 
0.850 
(6.33) 
       
HML 0.225 
(1.33) 
0.053 
(0.36) 
0.060 
(0.41) 
0.266 
(1.60) 
0.116 
(0.68) 
0.100 
(0.60) 
       
UMD 0.022 
(0.20) 
-0.042 
(-0.44) 
-0.114 
(-1.19) 
0.018 
(0.17) 
-0.099 
(-0.90) 
-0.156 
(-1.46) 
       
Coefficient Comparisons 
 
  
   
Lim – None -0.010 
(-1.86) 
-0.011 
(-2.04) 
-0.008 
(-1.56) 
-0.009 
(-1.78) 
-0.009 
(-1.28) 
-0.006 
(-0.64) 
       
Spc – None -0.041 
(-4.08) 
-0.024 
(-2.83) 
-0.012 
(-1.53) 
-0.032 
(-3.34) 
-0.020 
(-2.09) 
-0.013 
(-1.46) 
       
Spc – Lim -0.031 
(-3.04) 
-0.013 
(-1.62) 
-0.004 
(-0.54) 
-0.024 
(-2.46) 
-0.010 
(-1.07) 
-0.007 
(-1.08) 
       
None Month-Obs 72 72 72  72 72 72 
Lim Month-Obs 71 71 71  71 71 71 
Spc Month-Obs 45 52 61  41 52 60 
Adj R
2 
0.589 0.609 0.592 0.578 0.539 0.568 
 
This table provides results from a regression of (Rport – Rf) = 0 + 1 (Rm – Rf) + 2 SMB + 3 HML + 
4 UMD + u, where Rport is the equally-weighted monthly return to a portfolio of firms selected if an 
insider initiates a sales transaction within Rule 10b5-1 in the preceding 1-, 3- or 6-month period, Rf 
is the one-month treasury bill rate, Rm is the equal-weighted monthly market return, and SMB, HML, 
and UMD are the monthly small-minus-big, high-minus-low, and momentum factors discussed in 
Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997). At least 3 firms must be present in each calendar-
month to form a portfolio. None designates observations from the inferred-non disclosure sample. 
Lim designates observations from the limited disclosure sample. Spc designates observations from 
the specific disclosure sample. 
